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Abstract: Ireland is distinguished by the high degree of openness of its labour market and the
importance of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the economy. We develop a neo-classical growth
model to explore the consequence of these characteristics for the response of an economy to the
kinds of shocks that are widely recognised to have been of importance in driving the Irish boom. 
I INTRODUCTION
I
n his discussion of Honohan and Walsh’s (2002) account of Ireland’s recent
growth performance, Olivier Blanchard suggests that the highly elastic
supplies of capital and labour available to the economy mean that exogenous
shocks will have more dramatic consequences than in the standard neo-
classical or “Solow” exogenous growth model. Such an economy, he argues, will
behave more like the AK model of endogenous growth theory which exhibits
constant returns to accumulable factors of production and in which shocks
have more substantial and long-lasting effects.
The essence of the Honohan and Walsh argument is that inappropriate
macroeconomic policies held Ireland back in earlier years, with the result that
“… convergence, when it occurred, was telescoped into a short period”. This
emphasis on ‘delayed convergence’grounds their analysis in exogenous growth
theory. We follow them in this but take up Blanchard’s suggestion by
contrasting the performance and responsiveness to shocks of neo-classical
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*An earlier version was presented at the Conference on Macroeconomic Perspectives in Honour of
Brendan M. Walsh, held at University College Dublin on 7 October, 2005.models with varying degrees of capital and labour mobility. Furthermore, we
subject these models to the kinds of shocks that we believe to have been
important in driving the Irish boom.
While based on the exogenous growth model, the analysis in our paper also
draws inspiration from what Barry (2002a) has characterised as the major
competing hypothesis to that of delayed convergence. The alternative
interpretation, as initially proposed by Krugman (1997), is that of “regional
boom”.1 Regional wages are largely determined by rates available in the wider
encompassing economy with which the region shares an open labour market.
Employment levels are determined therefore by labour demand, rather than,
as in a typical national economy with a closed labour market, by the
interaction of labour demand and supply. Labour demand is determined
primarily by the region’s export base (with non-tradable employment – both
public and private – arising largely to service that base). In modelling Ireland,
the export base can be thought of as the multinational sector.
Regional boom models have been developed by Dascher (2000) and Barry
(2002b) to elucidate aspects of the Irish experience, though not in a growth-
theory context. 
Capital and labour inflows stimulate each other in the regional models,
generating substantial “extensive growth” as well as the “intensive growth” in
income-per-head terms that is the focus of convergence theory. In these models
the boom ultimately comes to an end when labour inflows dry up through
housing and infrastructure congestion, while dramatic growth can easily turn
into dramatic decline in the event of adverse shocks. This regional perspective
seems to us to be close in spirit to the model that Blanchard proposes.2
The model we present here represents a half-way house between the
delayed-convergence and regional-boom perspectives. Since ours is an
exogenous rather than endogenous growth model, there is indeed convergence
to an exogenous steady state.3 We allow for highly elastic supplies of capital
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1An important distinction between the perspectives is that the first approach proposes that
convergence will follow if Ireland follows the same policies as the rest of the EU. The second
suggests that non-orthodox policies such as lower corporation tax rates may be required to
surmount the core-periphery gap; see e.g., Borck and Pflueger (2004), which builds on Baldwin
and Krugman (2004). 
2Though Blanchard (2000) does not devote much attention to foreign direct investment (FDI), he
does mention a third feature – besides the openness of capital and labour markets – that may
make the Irish economy function more like the AK model: the shift towards the production of more
capital intensive goods. This is associated with the FDI-intensity of the economy.
3This does not necessarily imply that the convergence process should stop when Ireland has
reached average Western European living standards. GDP per head may continue to converge on
the US; Krugman (1979).and labour however, as in the regional-economy model.4 Furthermore, all
goods are tradable and all capital is foreign owned so the export-base
perspective is embedded in our story.5
Having set up the model, we then submit it to several shocks which we
believe capture important elements of the factors that have driven the Irish
boom. The shocks are of three broad types: (i) an increase in the country’s
attractiveness to foreign capital, (ii) a reduction in labour-market distortions,
and (iii) an increase in total factor productivity.
The first of these serves as shorthand for a number of different
developments that occurred in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Honohan and
Walsh emphasise the beneficial effects of fiscal stabilisation. Our modelling of
this is influenced by the work of Miller, Skidelsky and Weller (1990), which
was, interestingly, one of the first papers in the literature on “expansionary
fiscal contraction”, a phenomenon that has been much discussed in the Irish
literature. This paper, and others in the literature such as Bertola and Drazen
(1993) and Sutherland (1997), are based on critical levels of government debt
– or “trigger points” – being reached, beyond which the effects of fiscal policy
on expectations are reversed. In Miller, Skidelsky and Weller (1990), the
critical level is reached when fiscal policy raises the rate on government bonds
substantially through an increased risk of taxes on bond holders being
imposed to prevent the public debt becoming unsustainable. We thus model
fiscal consolidation as a reduction in the risk premium on investments in
Ireland.6
Other shocks which also increase the inflow of capital for a given interest
rate include the advent of the Single European Market and the substantial
increase in EU regional aid flows from 1989 onwards. The Single Market led
to a substantial increase in FDI inflows into Europe and between European
countries, as evidenced by Dunning (1997), while the effect on Ireland was
compounded by the outlawing of restrictive public procurement policies within
the EU.7 The announced reduction in the rate of corporation tax on services in
the late 1990s can also be modelled in this way. This shock also captures
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4In the extreme case of perfect factor mobility, our model collapses to the AK model of endogenous
growth theory.
5Note that ours is not a growth accounting exercise such as de la Fuente and Vives (1997) and
Ahearne, Kydland and Wynne (2004), which are also based on the neo-classical growth model, but
a theoretical contribution, the importance of which we attempt to quantify.
6De la Fuente and Vives (1997) concur, suggesting that “… fiscal consolidation may have acted as
a catalyst, helping to change foreign investors’ perceptions of the country”.
7MacSharry and White (2000) explain how restrictive procurement policies on the part of some of
the larger EU member states had offered a strong incentive to transnational corporations to locate
there rather than in Ireland. With the outlawing of these practices, the attractiveness of Ireland
as a destination for FDI increased.elements of the economic geography perspective proposed by Krugman (1997),
who notes that the declining importance of conventional transport costs in
international trade has made Ireland less ‘peripheral’ and therefore more
attractive as an export platform for FDI.
Our second shock represents a decline in labour-market distortions, which
Honohan and Walsh also emphasise. They note that “… wage restraint has
been a hallmark of the recovery. This is partly attributable to the high levels
of unemployment that had been reached in Ireland and the United Kingdom,
partly to union restraint exercised in the process of centralised pay
agreements (associated with tax reductions) and partly, perhaps, to reduced
union power in much of the economy”. 
Proponents of the importance of social partnership point to the Calmfors
and Driffill (1989) proposition that labour-market outcomes associated with
either a “corporatist” well-organised central bargaining system or a US-type
system in which labour unions have very little power are better than those
generated by decentralised collective bargaining systems such as had
previously prevailed in Ireland .8 There is broad agreement at least that social
partnership facilitated wage moderation by offering a forum in which it could
be traded for the promise of future income-tax reductions. We model these
processes as a shock that shifts the economy from an initial low-employment
monopoly-union equilibrium; Oswald (1985). 
Our third shock represents an increase in TFP. Crafts (2005) shows that
annual TFP growth in Ireland, calculated on a GNP basis, jumped from 1.68
per cent between 1979-89 to 2.51 per cent from 1989-99. He attributes much
of this to ICT production, based on inward FDI from the US.9 This shock,
therefore, we can think of as going hand-in-hand with the capital-market
shock discussed above. 
II COMPARATIVE STATICS OF THE MODEL
The structure of the model, which is presented formally in the next
section, is very simple, since we focus on the production side and ignore
consumption decisions and the time path of consumption and saving. We have
a model of imperfect labour mobility where the decision whether to work at
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8The essential idea is that at both extremes labour-market outsiders have a greater voice in the
determination of labour-market outcomes.
9In 2000, computer equipment employment in Ireland was ten times greater than that in the
EU15 (as a proportion of manufacturing employment); electronic components was four times
greater, and software about one and a half times (as a share of manufacturing and market
services); Barry and Curran (2004).home or abroad depends on preferences and the relative wage available in the
two locations.10 Thus labour supply and employment can be written as:
L=    (D; w/w*) with  1,  2 > 0. (1)
where w is the domestic wage, w* the foreign wage and D is a shock term
representing a reduction in labour-market distortions. The distorted labour
supply schedule lies to the left of the undistorted schedule. 
Imperfect capital mobility means that the cost of domestic borrowing is
related to the total stock of borrowing. This equals the capital stock, which is
owned in its entirety by foreign investors. Thus the required rate of return on
capital is:
r = r* + Φ(S; K) (2)
where r* is the foreign interest rate and S represents the beneficial capital-
market shocks discussed earlier, with Φ1 < 0 and Φ2 > 0.
Output is given by the CRS production function:
Y = AF(K,L) (3)
which yields 
AFL (K/L) = w (4)
and
p = c(w,r)/A (5)
With output prices exogenous (given the small open economy assumption),
these five equations then determine the five endogenous variables Y, K, L, w
and r.11
10Technically, each individual allocates part of his or her working life to the two locations so that
the population with whose income per head we are concerned remains static. There is no
unemployment in the formal model. Unemployment could be taken into account by introducing it
as another state over which individuals have preferences. If social welfare payments remained
constant throughout the analysis (as we assume the foreign wage does), the unemployment rate
would then rise or fall in line with emigration, which is broadly consistent with the Irish
experience. 
11The cost function in Equation (5) is linearly homogenous. For the Cobb-Douglas production
function Y=AKα L1–α , for example, the price-cost equation is p=c(rαw1–α)/A.
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A, a labour-market shock D and a capital market shock S. Noting that
Equation (5) allows us express r in terms of w, we can then employ Equations
(1), (2) and (4) to find the effects on K, L and w. It can easily be shown that K
and L (and thus GDP, GDP per head of population, and labour productivity)
rise in response to each shock, while w rises in response to the technology and
capital-market shocks but falls in response to the labour-market shock. (Even
in this latter case, however, GNP – which in our simple model corresponds to
the total wage bill – rises.) Since K and L respond together to each of our
shocks, we will concentrate on GNP, where some of the effects might be less
obvious.
The model can be presented graphically, in wage-employment space, as
follows. The labour-market equilibrium locus LL, is upward sloping, with
slope (1/ 2). LL is steeper the less mobile is labour (i.e., the lower is  2). The
capital-market locus KK is derived from Equations (2), (4) and (5) and is
downward- sloping with a slope of:
– cr Φ2 K/L / [cw + cr Φ2 (L/AFL')]    < 0
The elasticity of KK lies between zero and minus one. KK is steeper the
less internationally mobile is capital (i.e., the higher is Φ2). Now consider a
beneficial labour-market shock D which shifts LL to the right. This reduces w
and raises L, with the slope of KK ensuring that GNP rises. Furthermore, the
rightward shift of LL does not depend on the degree of capital mobility. Thus
the impact on GNP is higher the greater the mobility of capital.
An interesting result arises if the rightward shift of LL is independent of
the degree of labour mobility, as it may be under some formulations of the
labour-market shock. In this case, the flatter is LL (i.e., the higher the degree
of labour mobility, denoted LLHLM in Figure 1), the smaller the fall in wages
and the lower the increase in employment and national income. A low degree
of labour mobility causes wages to fall more in response to labour-market
liberalisation, giving rise to a larger increase in the return to capital, which
triggers strong capital inflows and ultimately higher employment than in the
case where labour is more mobile. This can be seen by comparing the
equilibria at points 2 and 3, corresponding to high and low labour mobility
respectively, in Figure 1.
The other two shocks, the capital-market shock and the shock to TFP,
leave LL unchanged and instead shift the KK curve. Thus w and L move in the
same direction in these cases. The impact on GNP of both the capital-market
and the TFP shock is rising in  2 and falling in Φ2. Thus the greater the degree
250 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEWof labour mobility (i.e., the higher is  2) and the greater the degree of capital
mobility (i.e., the lower is Φ2), the greater the effect of these shocks on long-
run equilibrium GNP.
III THE FORMAL MODEL
We try to write down a simple, parsimonious model which can capture the
main internal and external channels of importance in the Irish growth of the
1990s. As discussed above, the essential features of the analysis are a
combination of high capital mobility (in the form of FDI) and labour mobility.
We simplify by assuming that all capital accumulation is financed by foreign
borrowing (and hence owned by foreign investors). Domestic residents receive
and consume only their wage income. While this is obviously an extreme
assumption, nothing of consequence in our analysis depends on it, and it has
the benefit of allowing us to highlight the gap between national output and
national income, or GDP and GNP, a distinction that is of great importance for
the Irish economy. 
The structure of the model is as follows. Throughout we will assume just
one sector of production, which uses capital and labour. All capital represents
FDI, and must earn a given world rate of return plus a country specific risk
premium. Labour supply comes from domestic households. Households are
assumed to make a choice between supplying labour in the home economy, at
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Figure 1: Outcome of a Labour-Market Shock, with Low and 
High Labour Mobility        
        .
the given wage rate, or emigrating abroad to work. Households are not
indifferent between labour supplied in the domestic economy and working
abroad – we assume that they have well defined preferences over the two
alternatives. 
The Household and Labour Supply
The household in the model has preferences over consumption C and
labour supply  1 and  2 in the two locations 1 and 2, (where the wages in each
location are w1 and w2, respectively) given by:
U = C
ϕ  µ1 1 + µ2 2   .
The household maximises utility subject to the budget constraint 
C = w1 1 + w2 2, and a fixed total labour supply which must satisfy  1 +  2 = 1.
The idea behind this specification is that the household receives some non-
pecuniary benefit from the time spent working in a given location besides the
direct wage income earned. The household has a fixed total amount of labour
supply it can offer, which we normalise at unity. 
The first order condition for the household’s choice of location is given by:
(1 – ϕ) C
w1 – w2 = – –––––– ––––––––––––––– µ1 1  – µ2 2 (6)
ϕ
µ1 1 + µ2 2
Together with the constraint that  1 +  2 = 1, this describes a labour supply
schedule relating  1 positively to w1 and negatively to w2. Taking location 1 as
the home location, we thus have labour mobility such that households move
back into the home labour market as the home wage gap rises. But since
workers are not indifferent between locations, wages are not equalised
between them. 
In addition to capturing the idea that home and foreign labour markets
are linked, we also wish to analyse the consequences of labour market reform.
One way to model this process is to imagine that, preceding the growth take-
off, labour markets were dominated by monopoly unions. In this case, instead
of Equation (6) characterising the labour supply relationship, we have a
condition that is implied by the monopoly union choosing to maximise utility,
taking an aggregate labour demand equation as given. This gives 
∂ 1 
–1   (1 – ϕ) C
w1 – w2 =  1 –––  – –––––– ––––––––––––––– µ1 1   – µ2 2 (7)
∂w1 ϕ
µ1 1 + µ2 2
1 1 – –
θ
1 1 – –
θ
1 – –
θ
1 – –
θ
1 1 – –
θ
1 1 – –
θ
1 – –
θ
1 – –
θ
1 – ϕ ––––
1 1 – –
θ
1 1 – –
θ
1 1 – –
θ
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right hand side, which is positive, and captures the monopoly union distortion.
Since this term pushes up the required wage for each level of  1, conditional
on w2, the distorted labour supply schedule lies to the left of the undistorted
schedule. Without loss of generality, we then write the labour supply curve for
the domestic economy as:
 1 =  (w1)Θ, (8)
where  '(w1)>0, and Θ captures all other elements that affect labour supply.
In particular, a fall in the monopoly union distortion in the home economy
would imply a rise in Θ.12
Domestic Firms
Firms in the home economy hire labour and accumulate capital. The firm’s
instantaneous production function is written as
Y = AF(K, L). 
We assume that F(K, L) has constant returns to scale in capital and labour,
and A captures a total factor productivity shift variable. 
The firm may purchase capital at price q, and hires labour at the home
wage w1. The firm’s capital stock depreciates at instantaneous rate δ. The firm
will hire labour and purchase capital to satisfy
AFL(K, L) = w1 (9)
(r + δ)q = AFK(K, L) + q ·. (10)
The second condition simply says that the return on a unit of capital
should equal its opportunity cost, where r is the cost of external borrowing. 
Aggregate Capital Accumulation
We  assume that there are convex costs of capital installation (or
adjustment costs) in the home economy. The implication of adjustment costs is
that there will be a relationship between aggregate investment and the price
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12In referring to the term Θ as a ‘distortion’, even though it arises from a trade union maximising
utility, our terminology is in line with the usual description of monopoly pricing distortions. In
particular, employment is below its socially efficient level due to the presence of the Θ term.of capital captured by the function I = g(q), which satisfies the conditions 
g'(q)>0, and g(1) = δK. The aggregate capital stock then adjusts according to:
K
·
= g(q) – δK (11)
Foreign Investors
Foreign investors are modelled through the simple assumption that the
return on direct investment in the home economy must equal r. Following
recent literature (e.g., Turnovsky, 2002), we assume that there are frictions in
international capital markets which lead the cost of domestic borrowing to be
related to the total stock of borrowing (which, in our simplified modelling,
equals the capital stock). Thus, we assume that:
r = r* + Φ(K) (12)
where Φ'(K) > 0. 
Equilibrium
Equations (8)-(12), in combination with the labour market clearing
equation  1 = L give the full equilibrium for the economy. We can then solve
for w1, q, r, K and L. We simplify the system by putting Equations (7) and (8)
together to obtain the implicit function L = L(K, Θ, A). This function satisfies
L1 > 0, L2 >0   and L3 > 0. Using this in Equation (9), and combining Equations
(10) and (11), gives us a dynamic system in q and K which satisfies:
q · = (r* + Φ(K) + δ)q – AFK(K, L(K, Θ, A)), (13)
K
·
= g(q) – δK. (14)
The behaviour of the economy is illustrated in Figure 2. The q · = 0 schedule
represents the arbitrage equation determining the optimal capital stock, and
is downward sloping. The K
·
= 0 schedule is upward sloping. If the economy
begins with a relatively low capital stock, the price of capital is above its
steady state. This leads to positive net investment, and the economy converges
along the saddle path SS towards its steady state, characterised by
q = 1 (15)
(r* + Φ(K
–
) + δ) = AFK(K
–
, L(K
–
, Θ, A)) (16)
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Since we are abstracting from long-run growth in GDP per capita, we can
think of all growth in this model as ‘catch-up’, or the convergence that occurs
as GDP moves to a higher steady state. In a model where we properly
accounted for steady state growth in GDP per capita, the interpretation would
be that GDP grows temporarily at a rate higher than the steady state growth
rate. 
The steady state can be illustrated in Figure 3. The KK schedule describes
the capital market equilibrium as given by the steady state equation:
(r* + Φ(K
–
) + δ) = AFK(K
–
, L
–
)
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Figure 2: Dynamics
Figure 3: The Steady StateThis schedule is upward sloping in K-L space, but cuts the 45-degree line
from above. A rise in total factor productivity A or a fall in r* (capturing a fall
in the external risk premium) will shift the KK schedule up and to the left.
The LL schedule describes labour market equilibrium and is given by:
L
–
AFL(K
–
, L
–
) = w1 ––  Θ
where the right hand side comes from inverting the labour supply function (8).
The implicit assumption here is that an improvement in labour market
institutions leads to an increase in total labour supply at a given real wage,
but does not alter the elasticity of labour supply to changes in the home real
wage. The LL curve is also upward sloping, but intersects the 45-degree line
from below. A rise in Θ or a rise in A shifts the LL curve to the right. 
Our model thus captures three sources of growth – a reduction in the cost
of borrowing, changes in labour market institutions, or changes in total factor
productivity. In the first case, a fall in the external risk premium will shift the
KK curve up, and increase the capital labour ratio. This implies that long-run
output rises more than employment. An improvement in labour market
institutions however will have the opposite effect, reducing the capital labour
ratio, so long-run GDP rises by less than employment. Finally, a rise in total
factor productivity may increase or reduce the capital labour ratio, depending
on the elasticity of labour supply and the importance of the endogenous
external risk premium in foreign borrowing. 
IV GROWTH DYNAMICS
The critical features of the model are the openness of the labour and
capital markets. To illustrate this we simulate the quantitative response of the
model in a series of cases. We solve and simulate the model by linear
approximation around an initial steady state. In order to do this we are
required to choose numerical values for a number of key parameters. We
assume that the production function is Cobb-Douglas, and assume a capital
share equal to 0.36. The rate of capital depreciation is set at 10 per cent, so
that δ =0 .1. We assume that the implicit labour supply function (3) has a wage
elasticity equal to unity (see below for discussion). A critical factor in the
calibration is the magnitude of adjustment costs in investment. A low
elasticity of investment with respect to the price of capital implies higher
adjustment costs and slower convergence. We follow previous literature (see
Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1999) in assuming an elasticity of the price
256 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEWof capital with respect to investment of 0.3. Finally, we set r* = 0.05 and using
evidence on the sensitivity of interest rates to external debt from Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2001), we assume that (a) the elasticity of Φ(K) is equal to .01
and (b) the debt related risk premium is 2 per cent. 
Figure 4 illustrates the role of labour market openness in the growth
process. In the Figure, we compare two alternative convergence processes,
where in one case, the labour force is constant throughout, and in the second
case, employment responds endogenously to capital accumulation through the
process described in Equation (8). In both cases, we have set the initial capital
stock equal to 30 per cent of its steady state level, so that initial GDP is below
steady state GDP.13 As we can see from the Figure, the channel of endogenous
employment expansion during the growth process implies a higher steady
state GDP and a much higher growth rate during the convergence, beginning
from an initial low level of GDP. As capital accumulation takes place,
beginning from an initial low capital stock, the real wage in the home economy
rises, drawing in labour from outside, magnifying the process of accumulation
itself. 
Figure 4: Labour-Market Openness and Growth
Figure 5 illustrates the role of international capital markets. The Figure
again shows the convergence process, beginning from an initial capital stock
equal to 30 per cent of steady state capital, but now contrasting the baseline
calibration against a case where the opportunity cost of borrowing is sharply
rising in foreign debt – we set the elasticity of the function Φ(K) equal to unity.
This implies a much higher degree of restrictiveness of international capital
markets. Again we see that capital market openness is a critical feature of the
convergence process, in the same way as is labour market openness. With
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13Figures 4 and 5 have time in years on the horizontal axis and an index of GDP on the vertical.more restrictive capital markets, steady state output is significantly lower,
and the growth rate during convergence is much lower.
Figure 5: Capital-Market Openness and Growth
Quantitative Application
We now apply the model to the Irish growth experience. As is well known,
Ireland experienced a major increase in its growth rate during the 1990s.
Figure 6 displays GDP growth between 1970 and 2004. The average annual
growth rate of GDP from 1981-1990 was 3.8 per cent. In the 1991-2000 decade
this almost doubled to 7 per cent. Especially after 1995, growth rates rose
dramatically. From 2001-2004, GDP growth had returned close to the average
rates of the late 1980s. 
Figure 6: GDP Growth, 1970–2004
The full accounting for the sources of Ireland’s growth success is beyond
the scope of this paper. However, the large increase in growth rates during the
1990s suggests that important structural changes took place in the late 1980s
258 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEWor early 1990s that raised the long-run path of Irish GDP per capita. According
to the neo-classical growth model, this would lead to a rise in growth rates as
the economy converged to the higher growth path. While the long run growth
rate would be unchanged, the level of GDP per capita would be permanently
higher at all dates. At the same time, total employment, as illustrated in
Figure 7, increased dramatically. Between 1986 and 2004 employment
increased by 72 per cent (from around 1.1 million to 1.8 million). This was of
course the result of many factors; increased labour force participation, net in-
migration, and a collapse in unemployment. 
Figure 7: Employment (thousands)
Can our model assist in the interpretation of the Irish growth experience?
We have discussed three sources of growth shocks. How important could each
shock be in explaining the historical growth record? Table 1 gives some
indication of this. It documents the impact on GDP and employment of a fall
in the external risk premium, a shift in aggregate labour supply (due to labour
market reform), and a rise in total factor productivity. A fall in the risk
premium leads to an increase in long run GDP and employment. But the
A THEORETICAL GROWTH MODEL FOR IRELAND 259
Table 1: Steady State Effects of Shocks
r* Θ A A(1) A(2) A(3)
%% % %%%
Output 15 14 33 200 77 194
Employment 7 14 14 70 0 68
Notes: r* indicates a shock that cuts the external real interest rate by half. Θ represents
a labour market shock that directly increases employment by 10 per cent. A represents
a 10 per cent increase in total factor productivity. A(1) represents a shock that raises
GDP by 200 per cent and increases employment by 70 per cent, as in the data. A(2)
represents the same shock when there is no endogenous labour supply. A(3) represents
the same shock when the debt elasticity of external interest rates is increased from .01
to .1. impact is quite small. Even a halving of r*, from .05 to .025, increases long run
GDP by only 15 per cent. Since the share of capital in output is relatively
small, the interest elasticity of steady state output is quite small. As a result,
the reduction in the required rate of return on capital cannot account for the
scale of the growth, at least given the current calibration of the model. 
The second shock in the Table is an increase in labour supply resulting
from a rise in Θ, where we arbitrarily set the increase in Θ to 10 per cent. But
this has the counterfactual implication that the rise in GDP is less than the
increase in labour supply itself (although the difference between the two are
very small). In fact, GDP grew much faster than employment. 
Finally, a 10 per cent rise in total factor productivity raises long run GDP
by more than 30 per cent, while increasing employment by about 15 per cent.
Thus, shocks to total factor productivity differ from the other shocks in having
the potential to dramatically raise both GDP and employment while raising
the former more than the latter. 
How big a role did labour market openness play in the Irish growth
experience? To investigate this, we conduct the following experiment. Assume
that structural changes in the economy in the mid-1980s raised the long-run
path of GDP. We set this shock as an exogenous rise in total factor
productivity, although it may be attributed to various alternative factors, as
discussed above. We choose the size of the shock so that, given the other
parameter values, GDP trebles in a twenty year period, to conform with the
Irish experience. Simultaneously, we pick the elasticity of the labour supply
function (7) so that employment rises 70 per cent during the growth process.
This implies an elasticity of approximately unity. We then ask, how much
would GDP have risen, for the same shock, in the absence of labour market
openness? That is, if employment had not risen endogenously in response to
the rise in total factor productivity, how much would output have risen? We
find that labour market openness played a highly significant role. As shown in
Table 1, the implied increase in GDP in the absence of labour market openness
would have been 77 per cent, as opposed to the 200 per cent increase that
actually occurred. This translates to an average GDP growth of 3 per cent, as
opposed to the actual growth of around 6 per cent. 
We  also investigate the role of capital market openness in the growth
experience. We take the same total factor productivity shock as before, but
now, assuming labour market openness, we increase the debt elasticity of
external interest rates by a factor of 10, from 0.01 (as in Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti’s estimates) to 0.1. The results indicate that this would have had only
a minor dampening effect on the growth of GDP and employment. GDP still
rises by 194 per cent, and employment by 68 per cent. In fact even if we
increase the elasticity 50-fold, to 0.5, we find that GDP and employment would
260 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEWstill rise by 160 per cent and 59 per cent, respectively. Hence, a tentative
conclusion we may draw from our model is that of the two channels of
openness that were emphasised in Blanchard’s discussion, the labour market
channel was by far the most important for magnifying the rate of economic
growth in Ireland. 
V CONCLUSIONS
This paper has explored the consequence of capital and labour-market
openness for the response of an economy to the kinds of shocks that are widely
recognised to have been of importance in driving the Irish boom. We explored
three shocks: (i) an increase in the economy’s attractiveness to foreign capital,
(ii) a reduction in labour-market distortions, and (iii) an increase in total factor
productivity. Our findings show, at the theoretical level, that the effects on
GNP of all three shocks are magnified by the openness of factor markets.
Quantitatively, however, labour-market openness appears to be vastly more
significant for growth than capital-market openness, as proxied by the
elasticity of the risk premium with respect to foreign borrowing.
Of the three shocks considered, only the TFP shock appears capable of
generating an output and employment response of the magnitude seen over
the course of the Irish boom. Labour-market shocks generate as much growth
in employment as in GDP, which rules them out as a monocausal explanation.
Of course, all three shocks are likely to have occurred simultaneously. One
channel which we have not explored but which is likely to have been of major
importance concerns the relationship between TFP growth and the increased
FDI inflows of the period. This means that our capital-market and TFP shocks
would have been related in a way that we intend to explore in future work.
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